If reference to earlier decisions or historical analysis happens to be required, the present judgment, where the vast majority of all the relevant decisions have been collected, will normally suffice. We emphasise that the provisions of s.23 do not require any further judicial exegesis; the court will positively discourage references to previous decisions which exemplify but do not alter the principles identified by Lord Bingham in Pearson.
The court will normally expect the parties to provide a detailed analysis of the facts to assist it in the application of the statutory test, including an analysis of the following:
i) The psychiatric and/or psychological evidence or other information in relation to the appellant's mental state which was available at the time of trial.
ii) The evidence which has become available since the trial, and an explanation why it was not available at trial.
iii) The circumstances in which the appellant sought to raise on the appeal (a) the evidence available at the time of the trial and (b) evidence that has become available since the trial
iv) The reason why such evidence or information as was available at the time of the trial was not adduced or relied on at trial. This will ordinarily include details of the advice given, the reasons for the appellant's decision at trial and, subject to paragraph …, any relevant evidence of the mental condition in the period leading up to and at the time of the trial and its impact on his decision making capacity.
v) The impact of the fresh evidence on the issues argued at trial and whether and the extent to which it involves a re-arguing of issues considered at trial.
vi) The extent to which the opinions of the experts are agreed and where they are not.
These heads of analysis will not all necessarily apply in every case; in some cases additional areas of analysis may be required. However, any such analysis should suffice to assist and inform the court in its task of applying the provisions of s.23 (1) of the 1968 Act.
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