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Re A (conjoined twins) [2001] 2 WLR 480

Mary and Jodie were conjoined twins joined at the pelvis. Jodie was the stronger of the two and capable of living independently. However, Mary was weaker, she was described as having a primitive brain and was completely dependent on Jodie for her survival. According to medical evidence, if the twins were left as they were, Mary would eventually be too much of a strain on Jodie and they would both die. If they operated to separate them, this would inevitably lead to the death of Mary, but Jodie would have a strong chance of living an independent life. The parents refused consent for the operation to separate them. The doctors applied to the court for a declaration that it would be lawful and in the best interests of the children to operate. The High court granted the declaration on the grounds that the operation would be akin to withdrawal of support ie an omission rather than a positive act and also the death of Mary, although inevitable, was not the primary purpose of the operation. The parents appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the learned judge erred in holding that the operation was (i) in Mary's best interest, (ii) that it was in Jodie's best interest, and (iii) that in any event it would be legal.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed. The operation could be lawfully carried out by the doctors.

LJ Robert Walker:

(i)            The feelings of the twins' parents are entitled to great respect, especially so far as they are based on religious convictions. But as the matter has been referred to the court the court cannot escape the responsibility of deciding the matter to the best of its judgment as to the twins' best interests.
(ii) The judge erred in law in equating the proposed surgical operation with the discontinuance of medical treatment (as by disconnecting a heart-lung machine). Therefore the Court of Appeal must form its own view.
(iii) Mary has a right to life, under the common law of England (based as it is on Judeo-Christian foundations) and under the European Convention on Human Rights. It would be unlawful to kill Mary intentionally, that is to undertake an operation with the primary purpose of killing her.
(iv) But Jodie also has a right to life.
(v) Every human being's right to life carries with it, as an intrinsic part of it, rights of bodily integrity and autonomy - the right to have one's own body whole and intact and (on reaching an age of understanding) to take decisions about one's own body.
(vi) By a rare and tragic mischance, Mary and Jodie have both been deprived of the bodily integrity and autonomy which is their natural right. There is a strong presumption that an operation to separate them would be in the best interests of each of them.
(vii) In this case the purpose of the operation would be to separate the twins and so give Jodie a reasonably good prospect of a long and reasonably normal life. Mary's death would not be the purpose of the operation, although it would be its inevitable consequence. The operation would give her, even in death, bodily integrity as a human being. She would die, not because she was intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot sustain her life.
(viii) Continued life, whether long or short, would hold nothing for Mary except possible pain and discomfort, if indeed she can feel anything at all.
(ix) The proposed operation would therefore be in the best interests of each of the twins. The decision does not require the court to value one life above another.
(x) The proposed operation would not be unlawful. It would involve the positive act of invasive surgery and Mary's death would be foreseen as an inevitable consequence of an operation which is intended, and is necessary, to save Jodie's life. But Mary's death would not be the purpose or intention of the surgery, and she would die because tragically her body, on its own, is not and never has been viable.
I would therefore dismiss this appeal.




LJ Brooke:

If a sacrificial separation operation on conjoined twins were to be permitted in circumstances like these, there need be no room for the concern felt by Sir James Stephen that people would be too ready to avail themselves of exceptions to the law which they might suppose to apply to their cases (at the risk of other people's lives). Such an operation is, and is always likely to be, an exceptionally rare event, and because the medical literature shows that it is an operation to be avoided at all costs in the neonatal stage, there will be in practically every case the opportunity for the doctors to place the relevant facts before a court for approval (or otherwise) before the operation is attempted.

According to Sir James Stephen, there are three necessary requirements for the application of the doctrine of necessity:

(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;
(ii) no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved;
(iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.
Given that the principles of modern family law point irresistibly to the conclusion that the interests of Jodie must be preferred to the conflicting interests of Mary, I consider that all three of these requirements are satisfied in this case.
 
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